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I. INTRODUCTION 
Actions speak louder than words.  This paper challenges that axiom as it relates to 
a President’s role in enacting laws under the Presentment Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
Consider for a moment that you are ten years old and asking your mother if you 
can attend the movie at your local small-town theater.  The theater is the only one in town 
and it is featuring a film having an NC-171 rating.  Your mother tells you that it would 
violate movie theater rules for you to attend the movie and that she will not let you go to 
the movie … yet she hands you $10 and drives you to the theater in time for the movie.  
Do you have your mother’s approval to attend the movie?  Uncertainty arises because 
your mother’s words expressed disapproval, yet her actions expressed approval.  To some 
the uncertainty may be de minimis, even unapparent.  But to others the uncertainty is 
paralyzing even though the stakes may only involve getting grounded for a week. 
What if the penalty for disobedience is imprisonment or worse?  Precisely such a 
dilemma arises when a President of the United States signs a bill2 with a concomitant 
disapproving3 signing statement4. 
                                                 
1 An NC-17 rating means that participating theatres are not to allow anyone under the age of 17 to view the 
film.  The Motion Picture Association of America voluntarily provides movie ratings to guide parents in 
discerning the age-appropriateness of movies and requires that participating theaters adhere to rating 
regulations.   
2 Unless otherwise noted, reference to a “bill” makes reference to a bill that both Houses of Congress have 
approved and that they have presented to the President to consider enacting into law in accordance with the 
U.S. Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and cl. 3.). 
3 A disapproving signing statement is more than a non-approving signing statement (e.g., ambivalent 
comments), but must be sufficient evidence of disapproval to rebut the President’s signature as prima facie 
evidence of approval.  This paper defines “Approval” and “Disapproval” in Section II. C.  It should suffice 
to say here that there this paper acknowledges two types of disapproval sufficient to constitute disapproving 
signing statements:  “Interpretive Disapproval” and “Substantive Disapproval.”  A statement of Interpretive 
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Consider, for example, a situation where Congress passes a bill in order to inhibit 
terrorist attacks that forbids operation of a “vehicle” within a one hundred yards buffer 
zone of any government building without a special operating permit.  Further assume that 
the Congressional record reveals discussion in committee and in each House wherein 
“vehicle” was clearly articulated to mean motorized and non-motorized vehicles.  Yet, 
upon signing the bill the President declares that the bill forbids only motorized and not 
non-motorized vehicles from entering the buffer zone.  The words of the President 
express disapproval5 of the definition of “vehicle” that Congress set before him, yet his 
signature expresses approval.  Can you, as a law abiding citizen, ride a bicycle within one 
hundred yards of a government building or not?   
Consider yet another example where a President announces that he believes a bill 
before him is unconstitutional and that he will not enforce it – nonetheless, he signs the 
bill.  Again, the words of the President express disapproval of the bill while his action of 
signing expresses approval.  Do you need to obey the bill that was just signed as though it 
was law?   
                                                                                                                                                 
Disapproval expresses an understanding of a bill’s text different from a clearly expressed textual meaning 
of Congress.  For example, a signing statement declaring that the word “vehicle” in a bill means only non-
motorized devices while a clear Congressional record indicates that Congress meant “vehicle” to mean both 
motorized and non-motorized devices.  A statement of Substantive Disapproval does not conflict with a 
textual understanding of Congress, but rather conflicts with a clear purposeful intent of Congress in passing 
the bill.  For example, expression by a President that a bill or portion thereof is unconstitutional since it is 
contrary to the purpose of Congress to pass an unconstitutional bill. 
4 A signing statement is a public statement made by a President concerning a bill that the President makes 
concurrent with signing the bill. 
5 The conflict in this example is more apparent upon realizing that a President only has authority to approve 
or disapprove of a bill, but not amend a bill.  This point is brought out more authoritatively later in this 
paper.  (See, notes 25 and 26 and associated text, infra).  In the example, the President is attempting to 
amend the bill with a different interpretation of “vehicle.”  As such, the statement is a form of interpretive 
disapproval (see note 3, supra). 
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The Presentment Clause6 of the United States Constitution provides specific 
guidelines for and obligations on the President as to how he may enact a bill into law.  
The Presentment Clause requires that Congress present a President with a bill after both 
Houses have passed it and that “if he approve he shall sign it” thereby enacting the bill 
into law.7  A President must both approve and sign a bill to enact it into law.  Does a 
President approve of a bill and thereby enact it into law simply by signing it?  Or does his 
disapproving signing statement, as in each of the above examples, serve as evidence of 
his disapproval?  The Presentment Clause further obligates the President to return the bill 
with his objections to the House in which it originated if he does not approve.8  Does his 
failure to return the bill, particularly in combination with his signature, rebut his 
disapproving statements concerning the bill?   
Disapproving signing statements leave people and courts to contemplate these 
very questions – has the President actually enacted a bill into law or not when he orally 
expresses disapproval yet signs the bill?  On the balance of such uncertainty lie personal 
liberties – people should not have to sacrifice personal liberties to a law that was not 
legitimately enacted.  The balance is influenced by what carries more weight regarding 
approval under the Presentment Clause – a signature as evidence of approval or a 
disapproving signing statement as evidence of disapproval.  In other words, do the 
President’s actions of signing speak louder than his concomitant words of disapproval? 
This paper addresses the issue of whether a President enacts a bill by signing it 
despite offering a concurrent signing statement that conflicts and, thereby, disapproves of 
                                                 
6 For this paper, the Presentment Clause refers to both Clauses 2 and 3 of Article I, Section 7 of the United 
States Constitution.  Some commentators distinguish Clause 3 as the Second Presentment Clause or 
Residual Presentment clause because it was added after Clause 2 for the purpose of providing a broad 
definition to “bill”.  
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
  - 6 - 
at least a portion of the bill (a disapproving signing statement).  At the core of this issue 
is whether a President should be held accountable for a disapproving signing statement 
by acknowledging it for what it is – a public expression of disapproval of a bill.   
The current and conventional approach of the federal judiciary is to view a 
President’s signature sufficient to enact a bill into law.9  This conventional approach 
necessarily concludes that a President’s signature is sufficient and irrefutable evidence of 
approval.  Consequently, the federal courts find that a President’s action of signing 
speaks louder than his words of disapproval.  This conventional approach provides 
judicial efficiency in determining whether a President has enacted a bill into law by only 
requiring concrete evidence of a signature to reach a conclusion.  However, the 
conventional approach has historically provided a controversial loophole through which 
Presidents have attempted to use signing statements to effectively veto a portion or 
portions of a bill by introducing an interpretation of a bill different from Congress10 or 
negating a portion of a bill by interpreting it as unconstitutional11 while precluding 
Congressional review of the President’s interpretation.  Use of the controversial loophole 
has been less apparent during the recent presidential administration, possibly because the 
President has not had a need to bypass Congressional review since the same political 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Id. 
9 See sections III.A. and III.B.i., infra. 
10 Presidential signing statements have been controversial since President Jackson attempted what 
“amounted to an item veto” by asserting his own interpretation of a bill with his signing statement in 1830 
(See Roy E. Brownell II, Comment, The unnecessary Demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton 
Administration’s Costly Failure to Seek Acknowledgment of National Security Rescission, 47 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1273, 1351 n.350 (1998)).  Shortly later President Tyler similarly attempted to assert his interpretation 
of a bill through a signing statement, resulting in a House of Representatives report severely criticizing 
Jackson and Tyler’s actions as being an objection in substance and an approval in form. (See Charles J. 
Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 231 (1952)). 
11 See Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, 
48 ARK. L. REV. 313, 317 (1995).  The reference includes an appendix listing examples of presidential 
signing statements from each president from Eisenhower through the first Bush in which the President 
states a refusal to execute portions of a bill he is signing. 
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party has controlled both the Presidency and Congress.  Nonetheless, the loophole still 
lies sleeping for use at any time and, hence, remains a sleeping controversy.12 
This paper offers an alternative to the conventional approach, an approach that 
aligns better with the text, intent and purpose of the Presentment Clause than the 
conventional approach and that holds a President accountable for disapproving signing 
statements.  This alternative approach recognizes a disapproving signing statement as 
rebutting a President’s signature as prima facie evidence of approval.  Under this 
alternative approach the words of a President’s disapproving signing speak louder than 
his action of signing.   
Importantly, the alternate theory proposed in this paper does not necessarily 
conclude that a disapproving signing statement precludes a bill from becoming a valid 
law.  Rather, a bill signed by a President with a concomitant signing statement would be 
treated as subject to the “Pocket Veto” clause13 of the Constitution.  The bill was neither 
approved (as evidenced by the disapproving signing statement) nor returned to 
Congress14 with objections within ten days of presentment15.  As such, the bill would 
become law if congress was in session ten days after presentment or die without 
becoming law if congress is out of session ten days after presentment.  Therefore, 
Congress could rely on standard pocket veto safeguards in timing their presentment of a 
                                                 
12 Or perhaps not so sleeping of a controversy.  Judge Samuel Alito (now Justice Alito) was questioned 
repeatedly as to just what his position was regarding the impact that a President’s signing statement should 
have in interpreting legislation during his recent (January 10-12, 2006) Senate hearings as a nominee for 
the Supreme Court. 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence.  Under this provision a President can accomplish a “pocket 
veto” by inaction rather than by having to state reasons for objecting to the bill and returning it to Congress.  
Consequently, he can veto a bill by keeping the bill in his “pocket.” 
14 Presumably, a President assumes the bill becomes law upon his signature.  As such, he must submit the 
signed bill to the Archivist of the United States (see, 1 U.S.C.A. 106a (2005)). 
15 For a standard veto, a President must return a bill to the House of Congress where it originated along 
with his reasons for objection.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
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bill to the President when there is any question of whether the President would either act 
on it with a disapproving signing statement or not act on it at all. 
The objective of this paper is to provide seed for a careful and thorough 
consideration of what role a President’s disapproving signing statement should play in 
enacting and interpreting federal statutes.  This paper offers as “seed” an alternative 
approach to dealing with disapproving presidential signing statements; an approach that 
aligns more closely with the text, purpose and intent of the Presentment Clause than the 
present conventional approach.  The motivation behind this paper is to encourage 
consideration of how to address disapproving signing statements while the associated 
controversial loophole in enacting legislation sleeps in order to identify a well-reasoned 
way to resolve the controversy by the time the controversy again awakes. 
The first section of this paper establishes an authoritative foundation through an 
analysis of the text, intent and purpose of the Presentment Clause.  This foundation 
identifies a President’s obligations and power in the legislative process and serves as a 
basis of reasoning for the rest of the paper. 
The second section begins by examining how the federal court system views key 
Presentment Clause principles, revealing that the courts have increasingly been looking to 
a President’s signature as sufficient evidence of Presidential enactment of a bill.   
The second section then identifies two options for resolving conflict between 
signing a bill and a disapproving signing statement.  One option, ignoring the 
disapproving signing statement, is in line with the conventional trend of the federal 
courts.  This option is the “Louder Action Option” because the action of signing a bill 
speaks louder regarding approval than the words of the disapproving signing statement.  
The other option, recognizing that the disapproving signing statement rebuts the signature 
  - 9 - 
as evidence of approval, is more in line with the Presentment Clause.   This option is the 
“Louder Words Option” because the words of disapproval speak louder than the act of 
signing a bill.  The Louder words Option provides the core of the presently proposed non-
conventional approach. 
Finally, the paper considers the role of disapproving signing statements in 
interpreting statutes.  This final section introduces the controversial practice of using 
signing statements in statutory interpretation and then concludes that regardless of 
whether a disapproving signing statement influences the enacting of a statute such 
signing statements should not be used to interpret statutes. 
II. THE PRESENTMENT CLAUSE 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he 
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and 
proceed to reconsider it.16 
If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree 
to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two 
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.17 
But in all such Cases, the Votes of both Houses shall be 
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the Persons voting for and 
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House 
respectively.18 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days 
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same 
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress 
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a 
Law.19 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representative may be necessary (except on a 
question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United 
                                                 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, second sentence. 
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, third sentence. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence. 
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States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or 
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate 
and House of Representative, according to the rules and Limitations 
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.20 
 
A. Intent and Purpose 
The Framer’s intent behind the Presentment Clause was to give a President a 
qualified negative on legislation proposed by Congress.21   Delegates were largely of like 
mind at the Constitutional Convention in regards to wanting a President to have a 
negative power in the legislative process.22  The negative power, however, was 
intentionally established as a “qualified” negative power as opposed to an absolute 
negative power.23 A President’s negative power is “qualified” in the sense that Congress 
may still enact the bill into law despite a President’s disapproval.24  The intent of the 
framers was to enable a President to ensure well reasoned decision making on the part of 
Congress for questionable legislation, but not act as censor of legislation. 
Along those same lines, the drafters specifically granted a “negative” power and 
not a “modify” power.25  That is, the negative power of the Presentment Clause is an all 
                                                 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
21  For further analysis on this subject see, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-48 (1983).  Section III B 
of INS v. Chadha provides a thorough analysis of the intent and purpose behind the Presentment Clause. 
22 “In the convention there does not seem to have been much diversity of opinion on the subject of the 
propriety of giving to the president a negative on the laws.”  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 n.14, quoting 
from 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 611 (3d ed. 1858). 
23 The framers made a very conscious decision to grant a President only a qualified negative as opposed to 
an absolute negative.  At the time of the Constitutional Congress in 1786, 13 states had served as 
constitution testing laboratories and had drafted at least 20 state constitutions in all. (see, Robert F. 
Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and 
its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 543 (1989)).  By in large, the framers 
were very leery of granting an executive branch power after struggling against such power in England and 
with prior magistrates. (See Gordon S. Wood, Forward: State Constitution-Making in the American 
Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 914-16 (1993)).  Granting governors absolute veto power was a scary 
proposition.  South Carolina granted absolute veto power, but only from 1776-1778.  (see,, Williams, supra 
at 547).  As a result, most of the framers were keeping executive power to a minimum while trying to give 
enough power to provide a checks and balances opportunity in the government. (See id.). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, second and third sentences. 
25 The Federalist papers clearly indicate that the drafters sought to provide a “negative” power and not a 
“modifying” power.  The four Federalist Papers addressing the legislative power (Nos. 51, 66, 69 and 73) 
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or nothing power.  The Presentment Clause grants the President power to approve or 
disapprove a bill in its entirety, not the power to modify a bill by enacting portions and 
disapproving portions.  George Washington recognized this distinction by summarizing 
his Constitutional obligation under the Presentment Clause as follows:  “From the nature 
of the Constitution, I must approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.”26 
There were two purposes motivating the drafters to provide presidential negative 
power in legislation.27  The first purpose is to grant a President power to protect himself 
from Congressional efforts to limit presidential power.  Alexander Hamilton expressed a 
need for a President to be able to protect himself in this way: 
If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body, to 
invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic 
propriety would of themselves teach us, that one ought not to be left to the 
other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self 
defense.28 
 
The second purpose for creating a Presidential negative power over legislation 
was actually to ensure there was a national perspective in the legislative process in order 
to establish a well rounded form of checks and balances in the legislative process.  The 
President, who is elected by and accountable to the nation as a whole, provides this 
national perspective.29  The legislative process grants negating power to three 
                                                                                                                                                 
specifically refer to the “negative” of the President, indicating that the intent was to give the President 
negating power, not modifying power.  See, Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the 
Constitution, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 736, 761 (1993).   
26 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-1799 96 
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); see, also Zinn, supra note 10, at 239. 
27 Alexander Hamilton cited the purpose of the Presentment Clause this way:  “The primary inducement to 
conferring the power [of a negative] upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the second one 
is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through hast, 
inadvertence, or design.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 at 217 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d 
ed. 1981). 
28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 at 372 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). 
29 “The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, 
and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more 
representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are 
local and not country wide; and, as the President is elected for four years, with the mandate of the people to 
  - 12 - 
representative groups:  local representative populations through the House of 
Representatives, each state as a whole through the Senate, and the nation as a whole 
through the President.  “Each political actor can thus insist that laws advance the interest 
of its constituency.”30  Alexander Hamilton viewed the presidential negative power as 
“establish[ing] a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to guard the 
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to 
the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.”31  The framers 
felt the President was in the best position to provide a national perspective and serve the 
national good by protecting the interests of the nation as a whole in exercising his 
negative power over proposed legislation. 
The drafter’s desire for a presidential negative power in legislation was so strong 
that they added what is now Clause 3 to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution in 
response to James Madison’s concern that Congress may get around the presentment 
requirement of Clause 2 simply by calling their proposed law a “resolution” or “vote” 
instead of a “bill.”32  Clause 3 was meant to capture all forms of proposed laws under the 
presentment requirements of Clause 2.  
                                                                                                                                                 
exercise his executive power under the Constitution, there would seem to be no reasons for construing that 
instrument in such a way as to limit and hamper that power beyond the limitation of it, expressed or fairly 
implied.”  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926); “The opportunity for presidential veto would 
also guard against oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered legislative measures and would assure that a 
national perspective was part of the legislative process.”  Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the 
Realignment of the Balance of Power over the Public Lands: The Federal land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19 (1984). 
30 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2106 (2002). 
31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 at 372-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills, 1982). 
32 See, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 301-02, 304-05 (Max Farrand ed., Yale 
University Press 1966) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983).  See also,  Jonathan B. Fellows, 
Congressional Oversight Thought Legislative Veto After INS v. Chadha, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1244, 1248 
(1984) (stating, with reference to INS v. Chadha: “The next day the convention added the second 
presentment clause -- the present clause 3 -- in an attempt to ensure that Congress could not circumvent the 
possibility of the President's veto merely by relabeling its actions.”); John O. McGinnis and Michael B. 
Rappaport, Essay: The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the 
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L. J. 327, n.68 (1997)(“The Clause was 
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In summary, the intent of the Presentment Clause is to provide a President with a 
qualified negative power over legislation for the purpose of protecting his own interests 
and those of the nation as a whole from unwise legislation.  The qualified negative was 
meant to be applied to a bill in its entirety or not at all; it is not a modify power to negate 
only portions of a bill.  Finally, all forms of proposed laws are intended to be subject to 
the Presentment Clause. 
B. Textual Analysis 
The Presentment Clause defines a President’s role in the legislative process by 
empowering a President to enact into law a bill that has been passed by Congress with his 
approval and signature or to exercise a qualified negative that forces Congress to approve 
the bill by a supermajority33 to enact the bill into law.  This section analyses the text of 
the Presentment Clause to discern how we can tell whether a bill has become law or not.  
i. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, First Sentence 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he 
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and 
proceed to reconsider it.34 
The Presentment Clause begins by identifying what type of bill it concerns – a bill 
that has passed both Houses of Congress and that has been presented to the President.  
The first sentence further sets forth a requirement that for such a bill to become a law it 
must be presented to the President and then proceeds to establish obligations on the 
President as to what he should do with such a bill after presentment.   
                                                                                                                                                 
inserted to ensure that Congress could not circumvent the presentment requirement by calling proposed 
legislation by a name other than "bill."); Rappaport, supra note 25 at 752 (“The clause was added to protect 
against congressional attempts to evade presentment by styling proposed legislation as something other 
than a bill, such as a resolution or order.”). 
33 To present a bill to the President for consideration of enacting into law the bill must merely pass by 
simple majority (greater than fifty-percent) of the votes in each house.  However, if a President disapproves 
of the bill he can return it to Congress with his objections. (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence).  
This is a veto action.  Congress can enact the bill into law despite a veto only by achieving a two-thirds 
majority approval (“supermajority) of the bill.  (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, second sentence). 
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
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The paramount phrase at issue in this entire paper is the second clause of this first 
sentence: “If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections 
to that House in which it shall have originated.” This phrase actually comprises two if-
then logic statements:  
(1) “If he approve [then] he shall sign;” and  
(2) “if not [then] he shall return it ….”  
 If-then logic statements have a form of “If P, then Q,” wherein P is a hypothesis 
(or antecedent) and Q is a conclusion (or consequence).  When interpreting an if-then 
logic statement Q is obliged to be true (an obligation) when P is true.  However, it is 
important to realize that the opposite is not true – P is not obliged to be true just because 
Q is true.35  In other words, the domain where Q is true can be larger than the domain 
where P is true.  The only logic link between P and Q is that when P is true, Q becomes 
an obligation.   
Turning to the first if-then phrase “if he approves [then] he shall sign it,” the only 
logical textual requirement is that if a President approve a bill he has an obligation to sign 
the bill.36  Recognize that it is not a logical necessity from this phrase that a President 
has approved of a bill that he signs.   The domain of those instances where a President 
signs a bill may logically be larger than the domain of those instances where a President 
approves of a bill.  Therefore, a President’s signature on a bill does not serve as 
conclusive evidence of approval. 
                                                 
35 Two common misinterpretations of “If P, then Q” are: (1) if Q is true then P is true; and (2) if P is false 
then Q is false.  
36 The Supreme Court recognized this fact early on and stated: “The only duty required of the President by 
the Constitution in regard to a bill which he approves is, that he shall sign it.  Nothing more.” (Gardner v. 
The Collector, 73 U.S. 499, 506 (1867)). 
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It is further paramount to note that implicit in the first if-then phrase is a 
requirement that a President must both approve and sign a bill to enact it into law.   This 
conclusion is consistent with the statutory provision for promulgating federal statutes.37  
This conclusion is also necessary in view of the need to acknowledge the word “approve” 
under the constitutional interpretation principles that “every word in the document has 
independent meaning”38 and “that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly 
added”39.  Consequently, a President’s signature cannot enact a bill into law unless it 
actually evidences the President’s approval of the bill. 
Turning to the second if-then phrase “if not [then] he shall return it, with his 
objections to that House in which it shall have originated,” the antecedent of this logic 
statement (“if not”) logically refers in the negative back to the antecedent of the prior 
logic statement (if he approve).  Therefore, if a President “does not approve” of a bill he 
has an obligation to return it to “that House in which it shall have originated” with his 
objections.  Logically, in this context “does not approve” means “disapproves” rather 
than being merely indifferent.40   A President that disapproves of a bill presented to him 
by Congress has a constitutional obligation to return it to Congress with his objections.41  
                                                 
37 A statutory provision describing promulgation of laws refers to a bill that “becomes a law or takes effect” 
upon “having been approved by the President.” 1 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2005) (emphasis added). 
38 Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2672 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
39 Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938). 
40  “Not approving” may seem to encompass both being indifferent as well as disapproving.  However, the 
obligation of providing objections implies that the President has objections and is not indifferent to the bill.  
The fourth sentence provides for when the President is indifferent and does not act on a bill.  This 
conclusion is further supported by Clause 3 which specifically articulates the same situation with the term 
having been “disapproved” by the President.  Therefore, the obligation to return a bill with objections in the 
first sentence most logically applies to when a President “disapproves” of a bill and is not merely 
indifferent to it. 
41 The Supreme Court has recognized this precise obligation, as well as the obligation for a President to 
sign a bill he approves: “The Constitution in giving the President a qualified negative over legislation -- 
commonly called a veto -- entrusts him with an authority and imposes upon [a President] an obligation that 
are of the highest importance, in the execution of which it is made his duty not only to sign bills that he 
approves in order that they may become law, but to return bills that he disapproves, with his objections, 
in order that they may be reconsidered by Congress.” The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929). 
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Subsequent sentences in the Clause define how a bill may become law upon disapproval 
and return to Congress.   
Four key conclusions soundly stem from the first sentence of the Presentment 
Clause: (1) the Constitution obligates a President to sign a bill that he approves; (2) a 
President must both sign and approve of a bill in order to enact it into law; (3) a 
President’s signature on a bill is not conclusive evidence that the President approves of 
the bill; and (4) if a President disapproves of a bill he has an obligation to return it to its 
originating House in Congress, who shall then reconsider the bill. 
ii. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, Second and Third Sentences 
If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree 
to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two 
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.42 
But in all such Cases, the Votes of both Houses shall be 
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the Persons voting for and 
against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House 
respectively.43 
 
The second and third sentences define obligations on Congress for bills that the 
President has returned with his objections.  If both Houses of Congress approve of the bill 
by a two-thirds supermajority upon return and reconsideration, the bill becomes law 
despite the President’s disapproval.  Further discussion of this portion of the Presentment 
Clause is unnecessary since it has little effect on the issue of this paper. 
iii. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, Fourth Sentence 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days 
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same 
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress 
                                                 
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, second sentence. 
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, third sentence. 
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by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a 
Law.44 
This sentence constitutes the “Pocket Veto” clause of the Presentment Clause and 
addresses the fate of a bill presented to a President who fails to satisfy either option to 
approve and sign or disapprove and return the bill. 
The fourth sentence is in the form of an if-then logic statement with a primary 
antecedent (“If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him”) followed by alternative conclusions 
or consequences in the form of secondary if-then statements: “[If Congress has not 
adjourned, then] the Same shall be a Law in like manner as if he had signed it”; and [if] 
Congress by their Adjournment prevent[s] its Return, [then] it shall not be a law.” 
The primary antecedent indicates that the fourth sentence of Article I, Section 7, 
Clause 2 applies to bills that the President has failed to return to Congress within ten days 
of presentment.  Antecedents for the secondary if-then statements distinguish 
consequences of a truthful primary antecedent: if Congress is in session ten days after 
presenting the President with the bill, then the bill becomes law; but if Congress has 
adjourned within ten day of presenting the President with the bill the bill dies without 
becoming law.45 
A strict textural interpretation finds the fourth sentence in conflict with the first 
sentence in two ways.  First, the fourth sentence makes an unqualified statement that a 
bill fails to become law if Congress is adjourned ten days after presenting the President 
                                                 
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence. 
45 The Supreme Court held in The Pocket Veto Case that bills not signed or returned because Congress has 
adjourned die without becoming law otherwise they create long delay and public uncertainty concerning 
their enactment.  Adjournment must be sufficiently long to create long delay and “uncertainty” however.  A 
three-day adjournment is insufficiently long (see, Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 592 (1938)).  
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a nine week recess did not qualify as an adjournment sufficient to 
trigger a pocket veto.  (See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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the bill if the bill was not be returned to Congress – there is no exception stated for those 
bills that the President approves and signs.  Therefore, a bill approved and signed by a 
President should fail to become a law if Congress adjourns within ten days of 
presentment since a President must provide such a bill to the Archivist of the United 
States and not Congress.46  Nonetheless, it is understood from the context of the 
Presentment Clause that those bills approved and signed by a President are exempt from 
the fourth sentence provisions even though the text of the fourth sentence does not 
specifically provide as much. 
Second, the phrase “the Same shall be a Law, in like manner as if he had signed 
it” appears to indicate only a President’s signature is necessary to enact a bill into law.  
However, the first sentence states that Presidential approval is necessary in combination 
with the President’s signature.  The requirement of Presidential “approval” is also evident 
in Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 (see discussion infra) as well as in federal statute.47   
Therefore, it is proper to understand “as if he had signed it” to also require approval in 
the fourth sentence of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2. 
Interpretation of the fourth sentence must be consistent with the entire Section of 
the Constitution.48 Therefore, the fourth sentence must imply: (1) that the primary 
antecedent limits application of the fourth sentence to those bills that have not been 
approved and signed into law by a President; and (2) that reference to “signed” means 
“approved and signed”.  Consequently, the fourth sentence of Article I, Section 7, Clause 
2 provides that a bill that the President has not approved and signed and has not returned 
                                                 
46 See 1 USC §106(a) (2005). 
47 Id.  
48 Whole Code Doctrine of interpretation applies since the Constitution is the highest Code in the United 
States. 
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to Congress becomes law in ten days after presentment if Congress is not adjourned and 
the bill dies without becoming a law if Congress is adjourned. 
iv. Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representative may be necessary (except on a 
question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United 
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or 
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate 
and House of Representative, according to the rules and Limitations 
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.49 
 
Clause 3 restates Clause 2 in greater breadth.50  Clause 3 applies Clause 2 to all 
actions which require approval of both Houses of Congress, except actions to adjourn.  
Clause 3 encompasses Clause 2 since a “bill” falls within the scope of “order, resolution, 
[and] vote.”51 
As mentioned earlier, Clause 3 requires Presidential “approval” before a law can 
be enacted, which serves to reinforce that approval and signature are necessary for a 
President to enact a bill into law.  
 
v.  Summary of the Textual Analysis 
Three key points pertinent to this paper arise from a textual analysis of the 
Presentment Clause: 
                                                 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
50 See, note 32 and associated text.  Clause 3 is also referred to as the “Residual Presentment Clause” (see, 
e.g., McGinnis and Rappaport, supra note 32, at n.68; Glicksman, supra note 29, at 37; Rappaport, supra 
note 25, at 752-786), presumably because it captures any “residual” actions by Congress other than voting 
on bills within the Presentment Clause.  Clause 3 is also known as the “Second Presentment Clause” (see, 
e.g., Fellows, supra note 32, at 1248-1266 and W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to 
Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, n.111 (1992)), because it is a 
second statement of the Presentment Process. 
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(1) A President may only enact a bill into law by both approving and signing the 
bill upon presentment to him by Congress; 
(2) If a President disapproves of a bill presented to him he has an obligation to 
return the bill to Congress with his objections; and 
(3) If a President, upon presentment with a bill from Congress, does not: 
(a)  approve of and sign a bill; or 
(b)  return the bill to Congress within ten days of presentment, 
then the bill becomes law if Congress is in session and dies without becoming 
law if Congress is adjourned. 
 
C.  “Approve” versus “Disapprove” 
The Presentment Clause integrates a President into the legislative process. 52   A 
President can enact a bill into law with his approval and signature if both Houses of 
Congress have approved the bill.  Alternatively, a President can impede the enactment 
process if he disapproves of a bill by returning it to Congress with his objections.  Since a 
President’s role in the legislative process hinges largely on whether he approves or 
disapproves of a bill it is important to discern what these two terms mean in order to 
understand how the President participates in the legislative process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 A bill requires a majority vote of approval from each House, therefore constitutes a “vote.”  A bill may 
also qualify as a “resolution” that requires the concurrence of both Houses since a bill is a resolution to 
enact a law.  Similarly, a bill is an “order” to enact a law that is subject to Presidential review. 
52 A President’s role in the legislative process was clearly identified by the Supreme Court:  “It is beyond a 
doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.” (INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 947 (1983)).  There has been little debate on whether the President is constitutionally appointed a 
legislative role.  But see Mark Johnson Boulris, Comment, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive’s 
Interpretation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination Provision: A 
Circumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1057, 1065 
(1987) (“[T]he constitutional framework ‘refutes the idea that [the President] is to be a lawmaker,’ the 
majority stated that in addition to limiting the President’s role in the lawmaking process to recommending 
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The first sentence of the Presentment Clause declares that a necessary step for a 
President to enact a bill into law is that he “approve” the bill.  The rest of the Presentment 
Clause provides insight into the meaning of “approve.  The second sentence of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 2 indicates that a bill which a President disapproves and returns to 
Congress can become law if two thirds of the House to which the President returns the 
disapproved bill “agree to pass the [b]ill” and if “approved” by two thirds of the other 
House.  Clause 3 summarizes this procedure by indicating an Order, Resolution or Vote 
disapproved by the President shall take effect upon being “passed” by two thirds of both 
Houses of Congress.  The context of these sentences, evident in the interchangeable use 
of the pertinent terms, suggests that framers sought to have “approve” mean the same as 
“agree to pass” and “pass.”53  All three of these terms embody an intent that the bill 
becomes a law. 
Another route to discerning the meaning of “approve” that is valued by Originalist 
analysts is to look at its common usage of the day.54  A dictionary dating to 1755, the era 
when the drafters wrote the Constitution, provides five definitions for “approve”:  (1)  to 
like; to be please with; (2) to express liking; (3) to prove; to show; to justify; (4) to 
experience; (5) to make worthy of approbation.55  The same dictionary defines 
“disapprove” as “to dislike, to censure, to find fault with.”  Therefore, common usage of 
the day suggests that a President must take pleasure with and like a bill – and not find 
                                                                                                                                                 
laws he thinks wise and vetoing laws he thinks bad.”  interpreting and quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 587 (1952)). 
53 Interpretation must be contextually consistent with the rest of the Constitution, particularly within 
sections of an article dealing with the same subject.  This rule of interpretation is akin to the Whole Act 
doctrine of statutory interpretation.  To interpret otherwise would produce Constitutional conflicts and 
absurd results, both of which are counter to accepted doctrines of interpretation. 
54 Origionalist analysts seek to understand the meaning of terms as the drafters understood them when 
writing the Constitution.  
55 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE BY SAMUEL JOHNSON; AMS Press, Inc., New York, 1967, 
1755.   
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fault (i.e., not “disapprove”) of a bill to enact it into law.  Notably, the definitions of 
“approve” and “disapprove” have not changed significantly in modern day usage.56  
Therefore, the meaning from common usage of the day is equivalent to the meaning of 
common usage of today, which is important to non-Originalist analysts.57 
The context of “approve” in the Presentment Clause and its common day meaning 
indicates that for a President to “approve” a bill means that he must like the bill in some 
manner, intend for it to take effect as law and not find fault with it.  This is consistent 
with an early (1880) Supreme Court analysis that indicated a President must “assent” to a 
bill in order to enact it into law.58  The President must agree, though not necessarily on a 
personal level,59 with what Congress is proposing in the bill in order to enact the bill into 
law.  
Disapproval is more than mere ambivalence or lack of approval.  “Disapprove” is 
the opposite of “approve”.  Therefore, for a President to “disapprove” of a bill, he must 
dislike the bill on more than a personal level, intend that it not take effect as law and find 
fault with it.  When a President expresses fault with a bill or an intent that it not take 
effect as law, the President is expressing disapproval of that bill.   
A President can express disapproval of a bill in two ways.  First, he may express 
“interpretive disapproval” by expressing an interpretation of a bill’s text that contradicts a 
clear interpretation of a material portion of the text set forth by Congress in passing the 
                                                 
56 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997) provides the following definitions – 
Approve: 1) prove, attest. 2) to have or express a favorable opinion of. 3) (a) to accept as satisfactory. (b) 
to give formal or official sanction to; to take a favorable view. Disapprove:  1) to pass unfavorable 
judgment on. 2) to refuse approval to; reject. 
57 Non-origionalist analysts are less concerned about the meaning constitutional terms had at the time the 
Constitution was drafted and are more concerned with the meaning terms have currently.  In this case, the 
origionalist and non-origionalist interpretation coincide. 
58 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880). 
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bill.  For example, consider again the situation where Congress passes a bill regulating 
vehicle use within one hundred yards of a government building and legislative history 
makes clear that the undisputed meaning of “vehicle” includes both motorized and non-
motorized devices.  If a President declares that the bill is limited to only motorized 
vehicles as he signs the bill, the President is expressing an intent that the full text of a bill 
as presented to him by Congress not take effect as law – therefore, he is expressing 
disapproval (interpretive disapproval).  Second, a President may express “substantive 
disapproval” by accepting Congress’s textual interpretation but denying Congress’s clear 
intent and purpose for the bill.  For example, a President’s declaration that a portion of a 
bill unconstitutional and that he intends not to enforce that potion of the bill conflicts 
with Congress’s intent to enact a law they believe is constitutional.  Such a statement 
expresses fault with the bill on a constitutional level and an intent that the bill not take 
effect as law – therefore, the statement is one of disapproval (substantive disapproval).  
What if a President disapproves of only a portion of a bill?  The result is the same 
since a President cannot parse bills set before him by enacting some portions and 
rejecting other portions.  Allowing a President to approve of (and enact) portions of a bill 
and disapprove of (and reject) other portions of a bill allows him power to modify the bill 
– yet the Constitution only grants him power to approve or negate the bill in toto.60  To 
allow a President to enact a bill into law while disapproving of portions of the bill 
violates the intent and text of the Presentment Clause in two ways:  (1) it effectively 
serves as an absolute negative power instead of a qualified negative power for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 “The fact that the President signs a bill into law, and thereafter defends it, without more, does not mean, 
of course, that the policy embodied in the legislation is that of the President, nor does it even mean that the 
President personally approves of the measure.”  (Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 US 525, 522 (1977)). 
60 See notes 25 and 26, supra, and associated text discussing the intent and purpose of the Presentment 
Clause. 
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President since Congress was not given a chance to review and possibly override the 
President’s objections; and (2) it allows a President to bypass his constitutional obligation 
to return a bill to Congress with his objections if he disapproves of it.61  Hence, a 
President’s express disapproval of any portion of a bill must constitute disapproval of the 
entire bill. 
III. DISAPPROVING SIGNING STATEMENTS IN ENACTING STATUTES 
Having laid a constitutional foundation with an analysis of the Presentment 
Clause, we now turn to the problem set forth at the outset of this paper – what happens 
when a President’s words and acts conflict in regards to enacting legislation?  In 
particular, has a President enacted a bill into law with his signature when accompanied by 
a disapproving signing statement?  To address this issue, one must harmonize two 
incomplete and opposing positions: 
(a)   In one sense, the President appeared to enact the bill into law through his act 
of signing the bill.  A President enacts a bill into law by approving of it and 
signing it as evidence of his approval   However, the President’s words 
indicate that he does not approve of the bill so he has not fulfilled the 
necessary element to enacted the bill into law. 
 (b)    In another sense, the President appeared to disapprove of the bill by his 
statement of disapproval.  When a President disapproves of a bill he is 
obligated to return it to Congress with his objections.62  However, the 
President has failed to fulfill his constitutional obligation to return the bill to 
Congress with his objections if he does not approve of the bill.   
This section first explores how the federal courts have sought to resolve this 
apparent conflict by looking at the weight the federal courts afford presidential 
“approval” apart from presidential “signature” in the context of the Presentment Clause.  
The federal courts have established a convention of relying on the signature as self-
sufficient and virtually irrefutable evidence of approval.  
Next, this section looks back to the analysis of the Presentment Clause and 
identifies two options for resolving the conflict that are constitutional:  (1) ignore the 
signing statement and recognize the signature as inherently including approval (Louder 
Action Option); or (2) recognize the disapproving signing statement as evidence of 
disapproval which rebuts the signature as evidence of approval (Louder Words Option).  
The first of the two options is consistent with the trend of the federal courts.  However, 
this paper argues that the second option offers an alternative to the conventional approach 
of the federal courts that is more constitutionally sound.  
A. Federal Courts on Disapproving Signing Statements and Approval 
                                                 
61 “If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
  - 25 - 
In federal courts, the President’s action of signing a bill has been getting louder 
over the years and now drowns out a President’s words in a disapproving signing 
statement.  This section explores how the federal court views the Presentment Clause’s 
requirement of presidential approval relative to the requirement of presidential signature. 
 
 
i.  Early Supreme Court– Signature is Evidence of Approval 
The Supreme Court first had to wrestle with the concept of presidential approval 
under the Presentment during the case of Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. 499 (1867).  
At issue in Gardner was whether the President must date a bill he signs in order to enact 
the bill into law.63  The Court found that (emphasis added): 
The only duty required of the President by the Constitution in regard to a 
bill which he approves is, that he shall sign it.  Nothing more.  The simple 
signing his name at the appropriate place is the one act which the 
Constitution requires of him as the evidence of his approval, and upon his 
performance of this act the bill becomes a law.64 
 
There are two messages in the holding of Gardner.  A popular message taken from 
Gardner is that the only act that the Constitution requires of a President to enact a bill 
into law is that he sign the bill.65  Equally important, however, is the role the act of 
signing plays – evidence of approval.  A signature cannot serve as evidence of approval if 
there is no approval.  Therefore, the Court’s reasoning indicates that both approval and 
signature are necessary for a President to enact a bill into law.   
Interestingly, the Defendant in Gardner argued that the Constitution does not 
require approval but only a signature, stating that “[t]he word ‘approved’ is 
                                                 
63 The plaintiff, Gardner, sought to recover taxes on tea that he was forced to pay in 1964.  The tax was 
required under a statute signed by President Lincoln and dated: “December 24.”  The President signed the 
bill in 1961, but did not indicate the year with the date.  Gardner argued that ambiguity in the date of 
signing caused the approval by the President to provide improper notice as to when the law allegedly went 
into affect.  Gardner further argued that use of parol evidence to establish the year was inappropriate.  The 
Court ultimately disagreed with Gardner and found the bill had become law in 1961 when the President 
approved it and signed it. 
64 Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. 499, 506 (1867). 
65 See Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Construction and Application of Federal 
Constitution’s Art. I, § 7, cl 2 and 3, Concerning Presentment of Congressional Bills, Orders, Resolutions, 
and Votes to President and Their Approval or Disapproval (Veto) by President, 141 L.ED. 2D 825, chapter 
III, section 7 (Copyright 2005 LEXIS Law Publishing). 
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surplusage.”66  The Court ruled for the Defendant yet conspicuously declined to adopt 
the Defendant’s position that “approval” is surplusage within the Presentment Clause.  
The Gardner Court did not, however, articulate what “approval” means beyond a 
signature.  Subsequent Supreme Courts have generally followed suit.67 
ii. Recent Trend – Not Much Left to Approval Beyond Signature 
The Supreme Court has avoided the difficult task of clearly defining what 
constitutes “approval” under the Presentment Clause.  Nonetheless, individual justices 
have been more transparent.  Some Justices interpret the Presentment Clause with a focus 
on a need for a President’s approval in addition to the President’s signature68 while other 
Justices focus solely on a need for a President’s signature and minimize, or even deny 
any difference between the President’s approval and signature for enacting a bill into 
law.69   Such tension between Justices has likely hindered the Court as a whole from 
clearly articulating what constitutes Presidential approval.  While the Court has avoided 
defining “approval”, it has narrowed the scope on what can serve as evidence of 
disapproval sufficient to rebut a President’s signature of a bill – to a point where it is 
questionable whether approval requires anything beyond mere signature. 
A presidential signing statement expressing that the President finds a portion of a 
bill unconstitutional and that he does not intend to enforce it qualifies as an expression of 
                                                 
66 Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. at 503. 
67 In 1880 the Court did venture to state that the Presentment Clause requires the President’s “assent” to 
enact a bill into law. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881)). 
68 See, e.g., Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. at 506 (Justice Miller articulates that a President must sign a 
bill only as evidence the evidence of his approval, implying that signature is in addition to approval); The 
Pocket Veto Case,  279 U.S. 655, 677 (1929)(Justice Sanford articulated that a President has an obligation 
to sign a bill of which he approves). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 403 (1990) (Justices Steven and O’Connor, 
concurring in judgment) (“I [] interpret § 7 to provide that even an improperly originated bill becomes law 
if it meets the procedural requirements [of signing] specified later in that section.”);  Wright v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 583, 598, 599 (1938)(Justice Stone, concurring, articulates the President’s options under 
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substantive disapproval of the bill.70  Nonetheless, “every President since Eisenhower 
has issued signing statements in which he stated that he would refuse to execute 
unconstitutional provisions.”71  Moreover, the Supreme Court has “implicitly 
endorsed”72 a President enacting a bill into law despite a signing statement articulating 
an intent not to enforce a portion of the bill on constitutional grounds.73  The Court has 
only commented on a presidential signing statement declaring a portion of a bill is 
unconstitutional.  However, at least one author would not limit the Court’s position so 
strictly and asserts that a President can properly express in a signing statement that he 
finds a bill unconstitutional on its face and that he does not intend to enforce it, yet still 
sign the bill into law.74   The authority offers in support Department of Justice advisory 
statements from the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations affirm that a President has 
a constitutional right not to enforce an unconstitutional law75 and argues such a position 
is consistent with the Framers view of the Constitution.76 
If a President can declare a bill unconstitutional and refuse to enforce it, yet can 
enact the bill into law by signing it, is there any meaning to “approve” apart from “sign” 
under the Presentment Clause?  The Supreme Court has avoided directly answering this 
question, but the District Court in the District of Columbia has been less timid. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Presentment Clause are to sign or disapprove of a bill); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 
U.S. 423,455 (Justice Harlan refers to the President’s approval action as “approving it by his signature”). 
70 Recall from the discussion of approval and disapproval, supra, that a substantive disapproval is a 
statement in that is consistent with Congress’s textual meaning of a bill but conflict with Congress’s intent 
and purpose for a bill. 
71 Dellinger, supra note 11, at 317.  The reference includes an appendix listing examples of presidential 
signing statements from each president from Eisenhower through the first Bush in which the President in 
which the President states a refusal to execute portions of a bill he is signing.  
72 Id. at 314. 
73 The Court acknowledges that “it is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts 
which are objectionable on constitutional grounds.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, n.13 (1983). 
74 Walter Dellinger, Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum Counsel to the President, 48 ARK. L. REV. 
333, 335 (1995). 
75 Id. at 336, n.7. 
76 Id. at n.8. 
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iii. District Court in District of Columbia – Signature is Approval 
The District Court in the District of Columbia has articulated that which the 
Supreme Court has been approaching, but has avoided declaring:  “The President's 
judgment of approval coincides with his decision to sign a bill; it has no independent 
operative significance.”77  The District Court in the District of Columbia has merged the 
meaning of approve and sign from the Presentment Clause into a single requirement of 
signing.  The same court explained their conclusion by stating (emphasis in original): 
Whether a bill is or is not a law of the United States cannot depend on the 
President’s state of mind when he affixes his signature.  He may object to 
various appropriations and limited tax benefits – that is he may disapprove 
of them – but nevertheless sign a bill and thereby remain in full 
compliance with the Presentment Clause.78 
The District Court in the District of Columbia eliminated any distinction between 
a President’s need to approve a bill and need to sign the bill under the Presentment 
Clause.  To that court, a President’s signature on a bill is conclusive evidence of approval 
and enacts the bill into law. 
iv. Summary of the Federal Court Position 
The federal court system has evolved from distinguishing a President’s approval 
from his signature under the Presentment Clause to a position where approval means little 
or nothing beyond a signature.  The Supreme Court took an early stand in interpreting the 
                                                 
77 Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 34 (D D.C. 1997) (vacated and remanded for lack of standing, see Byrd 
v. Raines, 521 U.S. 81).  In Byrd, Plaintiff congressmen brought action challenging the constitutionality of 
a Line Item Veto Act.  The court ultimately found the Act unconstitutional under the Presentment Clause 
for empowering a President to modify a bill after signing the bill into law.  According to the Byrd court 
“The President’s contribution to the [legislative] process is his approval of (or objection to) legislation as 
Congress presents it to him.  His is merely a qualified check on the will of the legislature.”  Id. at 35.  After 
enacting a bill into law, a President only has authority to enforce the law and exceeds his power if he tries 
to amend the law after enacting it.  Id. 
78 Id. at 34. 
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Presentment Clause as requiring a President to both approve and sign a bill in order to 
enact that bill into law.  The Court has not attempted to succinctly define approval, or 
what might serve as sufficient evidence of disapproval to rebut a signature.  However, the 
Court has dramatically limited what may amount to sufficient evidence of disapproval to 
rebut a signature.  For example, the Court has indicated that a presidential signing 
statement articulating that a provision of a bill is unconstitutional and that the President 
will not enforce that portion of the bill does not preclude the bill from becoming a statute 
in view of the President’s concomitant signature on the bill.  The District Court in the 
District of Columbia has gone so far as to indicate a President’s signature enacts a bill 
into law under the Presentment Clause – regardless of the President’s actual disapproval 
of a portion of the bill.  The convention in the federal courts seems to be that signature is 
all that is necessary for a President to enact a bill into law under the Presentment Clause – 
the act of signing is louder than even concurrent words of disapproval.   
B. Options Under the Presentment Clause 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  Therefore, any resolution to the 
apparent conflict between a President’s act of signing a bill and his concomitant words of 
disapproval of the bill must be consistent with the Constitution.  The Presentment Clause 
provides the guidelines for such a constitutional resolution.  There are two options for 
resolving the conflict within the scope of the Presentment Clause text, intent and purpose.  
First, the disapproving signing statement can be ignored and his signature recognized as 
evidence of his approval.  Under this first option, the action of signing “speaks louder” 
than the disapproving words of the signing statement.  Hence, the first option is the 
“Louder Action Option”.  Alternatively, the disapproving signing statement can be 
recognized as evidence that the President does not approve of the bill despite his 
signature on the bill.  Under this second option, the words of disapproval speak louder 
than the act of signing the bill.  Hence, the second option is the “Louder Words Option.”  
This section discusses each of these two options in turn. 
i. The Louder Action Option: The Conventional Approach 
One may argue that by signing a bill, a President approves of enacting the bill into 
law, despite any words of disapproval accompanying his signature.  By signing the bill 
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the President satisfies his obligation for approving the bill.79  Furthermore, by not 
returning the bill to Congress with his objections he fails to satisfy his obligations for 
disapproving of the bill.80  Together, the President’s actions action of signing and 
inaction of failing to return the bill to Congress suggest that he approves of the bill.  
Despite any disapproving statements regarding the bill, he ultimately signed the bill – 
which evidences that his motivation to approve exceeds his motivation to disapprove.  
Besides, the President’s state of mind when he signed the bill is arguably inconsequential 
to whether he has enacted the bill or not.81  In essence, a President’s signature is non-
rebuttable material evidence of approval.  
The federal courts appear to be ruling in accordance with this Louder Action 
Option.  The Supreme Court has been minimizing the significance of any difference 
between the constitutional requirements of approving a bill and signing the bill.  The 
D.C.  District court has gone so far as to say the Constitution only requires that a 
President sign a bill to enact the bill into law.82  A President may even enact a bill into 
law by signing it despite presenting a concurrent disapproving signing statement that he 
finds at least a portion of a bill unconstitutional and will not to enforce it.83 
The Louder Action Option is attractive to courts since it offers expedience in 
establishing whether a President has enacted a bill into law.  There tends to be little 
debate over whether or not a President has signed a bill – there is either a material 
signature on the bill or not.  The courts also do not need to approach legal questions that 
may approach limits of justiciability by questioning whether the President has actually 
enacted a bill or not despite his signature on the bill.84 
However, the Louder Action Option can raise a public policy concern by 
presenting conflicting meanings of a law interpretively, substantively or both.  Under the 
Louder Action Option Congress may present a President with a bill having carefully 
selected text with well documented meaning through legislative debate, yet the President 
may declare in a signing statement a meaning of the text that conflicts with that of 
Congress (a textually disapproving signing statement).  A President may also declare that 
a portion of the bill is unconstitutional (a substantively disapproving signing statement) 
yet sign the bill and enact it into law.  Under either of these situations, the public is left 
with uncertainty as to whether to rely on Congress’ interpretation of the law or the 
President’s. 
Public uncertainty arising under the Louder Action Option is different in 
principle, if not affect, than that arising under a President’s exercise of enforcement 
                                                 
79 “If he approves he shall sign it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
80 “[I]f not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated.”  Id.   
81 Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. at 34 (“Whether a bill is or is not a law of the United States cannot depend 
on the President's state of mind when he affixes his signature”). 
82 Id. at 33. (“The President's judgment of approval coincides with his decision to sign a bill; it has no 
independent operative significance.”). 
83 A signing statement declaring a bill or any portion of the bill is unconstitutional and will not be enforced 
is a statement of disapproval, as established supra.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court indicates such a 
statement does not preclude the bill from being enacted into law by the President’s signature, as implied by 
the Court in INS v. Chadha.  (See Dellinger, supra note 11, at 314). 
84 We will explore the issue of justiciability further in the next subsection.  Suffice to say here that courts 
are hesitant to challenge the authority or acts of another branch of the government in a manner that may 
cause the other branch embarrassment under the political question doctrine. (See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 217 (1962)). 
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discretion85 of a law.  When a President exercises enforcement discretion there is no 
question but what the law is – a law-abiding citizen can know what the law is and how to 
abide by it.  The only question that arises by allowing presidential discretion in 
enforcement is whether an actual law will be enforced to its full scope.  In contrast, a 
law-abiding citizen has no way of knowing what is valid law and how to abide by it when 
a bill is signed by a president with a concomitant signing statement that interpretively or 
substantively contradicts Congress’s interpretation, intent or purpose of the bill.  The 
difference in principle is that a citizen can know what a law requires of him regardless of 
whether a President enforces it entirely or not, but the citizen necessarily is uncertain as 
to what a law requires of him when a President signs it with a disapproving signing 
statement.  The difference in affect is that a citizen can know how to obey a law if a 
President merely uses discretion as to how stringently to enforce it, but the citizen cannot 
know how to obey a bill that has been signed with a disapproving signing statement 
because it is unclear just what the law requires or means. 
Another concern with the Louder Action Option is that it strains the text, intent 
and purpose of the Presentment Clause.  The text86 of the Presentment Clause is strained 
by allowing a president to approve of a bill in form (in enacting it) but disapproving in 
effect (changing meaning, intent or purpose relative to Congress’s).  The Presentment 
Clause requires approval or disapproval and does not allow for both to coexist.  If the 
President disapproves of the bill sufficiently to affect enforcement of the enacted law, the 
courts should also recognize his disapproval in the formalities of enactment to avoid 
inconsistency.  The intent87 of the Presentment Clause is strained by effectually 
affording a President an absolute negative over legislation – that which he disapproves of 
by signing statement and refuses to enforce either by employing a different textual or 
substantive interpretation is never given an opportunity for review and possible remedy 
by Congress.  Therefore, the intent of a qualified negative is violated by affording a 
President an absolute negative power.  The purpose88 of the Presentment Clause is 
strained when the public reads the text of a law that formally looks legitimate but 
effectually is not – at least under the present administration.  Such an inconsistency 
creates confusion and uncertainty which is contrary to the national good and, therefore, 
contrary to the purpose of the Presentment Clause. 
The Louder Action Option may be attractive to courts for its efficiency but public 
policy and constitutional concerns raise questions as to whether it is the best option 
                                                 
85 This paper will avoid delving into an existing debate on whether a president has discretionary power to 
select and choose how extensively to enforce federal statues under the “Take Care” clause of the U.S. 
Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).  The confusion at issue in this paper is readily distinguishable from 
the issues of such a debate.  For the interested reader, one side of the discretionary power debate argues that 
a “President has the power to act as a steward of the people” by reading the “Take Care” clause broadly 
enough to allow a President broad discretion in making decisions about which laws to enforce. (see, Kim 
Rennard Tulsky, Judicial Review of Presidential Initiatives, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 421, 431, n.63 (1985)).  On 
the other side, there is strong evidence that the framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to preclude a 
President from suspending or dispensing with law by including the Take Care Clause (see, e.g., Stephen M. 
Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 KAN. L. REV. 383, 
388, n.40 (2001)).  
86 The text at issue here requires that a President both approve and sign a bill in order to enact it into law. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
87 The intent at issue here is to provide a President a qualified negative over proposed legislation. 
88 The purpose at issue here is to grant the President power to protect the interests of the nation as a whole. 
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available.  Courts must take care that requirements of the Presentment Clause are not “set 
aside merely to promote efficiency or convenience.”89 
ii. Louder Words Option:  An Alternative Approach 
One may assert that a President’s disapproving signing statement is evidence of 
disapproval of a bill and, hence, the President’s signature on the bill cannot evidence of 
his approval.  A President must both approve of a bill and sign it in order to enact it into 
law; his signature alone is insufficient. 90  His signature may serve as prima facie 
evidence of approval, but that evidence of approval remains subject to rebuttal by a 
disapproving signing statement. 91  Under this assertion, the President’s words 
(disapproving signing statement) speak louder than his action (of signing).  Hence, this 
proposal is the “Louder Words Option” and serves as an alternative to the conventional 
Louder Action Option. 
One may argue that a President has not disapproved of the bill since he did not 
return it to the House of Congress where it originated.  The President has a constitutional 
obligation to return a bill to the House of Congress where it originated along with his 
objections if he does not approve of the bill.92  Recall that the first sentence of the Clause 
2 in the Presentment Clause is an if-then logic statement.  In an if-then logic statement 
the antecedent (e.g., does not approve of the bill) obligates the consequence (e.g., 
returning a bill to congress).  Recall, however, that the consequence does not obligate the 
antecedent93 – in other words, a failure to return the bill to Congress does not impact the 
truthfulness of whether the President approved of the bill.  Therefore, the President’s 
failure to return the bill does not constitute lack of disapproval, rather a violation of a 
constitutional obligation arising from his disapproval. 
Under the Louder Words Option, a bill that a President signs but disapproves 
through a disapproving signing statement falls subject to the “pocket veto” portion of the 
Presentment Clause in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, fourth sentence of the Constitution 
since the President neither approved the bill nor returned the bill to Congress.94  The bill 
                                                 
89 Misty Ventura, comment, the Legislative Veto: A Move Away From Separation of Powers or a Tool to 
Ensure Nondelegation?, 49 SMU L. REV. 401, 421 (1996), interpreting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-
46.  The Court has stated that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”  
(INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).    
90 Notably, the Presentment Clause does not preclude a President from signing the bill even though he 
disapproves of it – but without approval the signature does not enact the bill into law. 
91 When considering whether the procedure enacting a bill into law is constitutional it is proper to initially 
presume that the law is valid (INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. at 944).  In the present situation, a President is 
unlikely to sign a bill by accident and a signature is necessary to enact a bill into law with approval.  In an 
absence of any other evidence, it is reasonable under the Presentment Clause to assume a signature 
evidences approval.  However, when there is evidence that there is not approval accompanying the signing 
– i.e., a disapproving signing statement – then the signature cannot evidence approval and the prima facie 
evidence is rebutted and the enactment, without Presidential approval, is unconstitutional and must fail. 
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence. 
93 Recall from note 35, supra, that assuming that P is true when Q is true is a common error with “If P, then 
Q” statements.   
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence applies to bills that the President has failed to enact and 
failed to return to Congress within 10 days of presentment.  Without having approved of the bill at issue, a 
President has not enacted it into law.  If he further fails to return it to the House in which it originated 
within 10 days of presentment, the fate of the bill depends on whether Congress is adjourned. 
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should become law 10 days after presentment if Congress is in session and should die 10 
days after presentment if Congress is adjourned.  Notably, if the bill becomes law, it is 
not as a result of the President’s enactment – the President did not participate in the 
legislative process whereby the bill became law.  On the contrary, he violated his 
constitutional obligation as part of the legislative process by not returning the bill to 
Congress. 
The Louder Words Option is better aligned with the text, intent and purpose of the 
Presentment Clause and better serves the public than the Louder Action Option.   
In contrast to the Louder Action Option, the Louder Words Option strictly 
embraces the full text of the Presentment Clause by respecting the approval requirement 
as distinct from the signature requirement.  A President’s signature does not necessitate 
his approval within the text of the Presentment Clause.  The Louder Words Option 
recognizes that a signature is only rebuttable evidence of approval and allows evidence of 
concomitant disapproval to rebut the signature.  In contrast, the Louder Action Option 
essentially reads the approval requirement out of the text by either ignoring the approval 
requirement or merging it with its distinct consequence of signing.   
The Louder Words Option complies with the intent of the Presentment Clause by 
limiting a President’s negative power to that qualified by Congressional review.  Any 
legitimate exercise of negative (veto) power by a President under the Louder Words 
Option remains subject to Congressional review by requiring return of the bill to 
Congress with grounds for objection. 95   In contrast to the Louder Action Option, an 
attempt by a President to exercise an unqualified negative power through a disapproving 
signing statement fails by triggering the pocket veto procedure96 of the Presentment 
Clause.  As a result, the Louder Words Option allows Congress to rely on safeguards 
provided by the pocket veto procedure by presenting controversial bills to a President 
more than ten days prior to adjourning. 
The Louder Words Option also makes it more difficult for a President to infringe 
the purpose of the Presentment Clause by confusing the nation as to the meaning of a 
law.  Recall that the two purposes of the Presentment Clause are to provide a President a 
qualified negative over proposed legislation in order to:  (1) protect the President from 
legislation that infringes his power; and (2) inhibit legislation that may not be in the best 
interest of the nation as a whole.  The Louder Words Option precludes a President from 
enacting a bill into law while attributing a meaning to the law that conflicts with that of 
Congress – an action that would not be in the best interest of the nation as a whole 
because it causes confusion.  Meanwhile, the Louder Words Option retains the Framers’ 
intended method for accomplishing the purpose of a qualified negative through the veto 
process.97  In contrast, the Louder Action Option allows a President to confuse the nation 
                                                 
95 If a President does not approve of a bill he is to “return it, with his Objections to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.  
If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together 
with the Objections, to the other  House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two 
thirds of that House, it shall become a law.”  (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first and second sentences). 
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence. 
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, first sentence empowers a President to return a bill with his objections to the 
House of Congress in which it originated with his reasons for objection.  Congress can then amend the bill 
to resolve the reasons for objection or attempt a difficult two-thirds supermajority vote of both houses to 
pass the bill into law without presidential approval. 
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by introducing conflicting meanings to a federal law or, worse yet, enacting an 
unconstitutional bill into law through the use of a disapproving signing statement. 
Finally, the Louder Words Option better serves public interests than the Louder 
Action Option.  In addition to precluding a President from introducing contradictory 
meaning to a law or enacting a law that he finds unconstitutional, the Louder Words 
Option holds a President accountable for his signing statements.  Under the Louder 
Words Option a President would have to decide whether to approve the bill or not – but 
would not be allowed to “walk the fence” by approving in form and disapproving in 
statement and effect.  Such legislative fence walking creates national uncertainty in our 
federal legislative process and should not be allowed.  The Louder Words Option 
mitigates this type of uncertainty by preventing a President from making signing 
statements in conflict with approval when enacting laws. 
iii.  Challenges to the Louder Words Option 
The Louder Words Option is subject to challenges including whether it raises 
justiciability issues in the form of a political question and whether it actually increases 
uncertainty in statutory validity.  This section examines these challenges and concludes 
that they are not persuasive concerns. 
Justiciability and the Political Question Doctrine 
 
The Constitution provides federal courts authority to hear certain cases and 
controversies.98  The Supreme Court has interpreted this power as a limitation on what 
types of matters a federal court may hear, limitations known as justiciability doctrines.99  
There are five major justiciability doctrines, one of which is the political question 
doctrine.100  The political question doctrine “refers to allegations of constitutional 
violations that federal courts will not adjudicate” but will rather leave “to the political 
branches of government to interpret and enforce.”101  One purpose for the political 
question doctrine is to maintain respect for the separate branches of government by 
minimizing judicial intrusion into the legislative and executive branches.102  “[T]he 
                                                 
98 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
99 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., Aspen 2001). 
100 Id.  The five justiciability doctrines are:  (1)  the prohibition against advisory opinion; (2) standing; (3) 
ripeness; (4) mootness; and (5) the political question doctrine. 
101 Id. at 76. 
102 Id. at 77. 
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nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of 
powers.”103 
The Supreme Court has identified the following six factors as possibly indicating 
a controversy is non-justiciable under the political question doctrine:104 
(1) A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or  
(2) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
(3) The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
(4) The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or 
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question. 
 
The political question doctrine is relevant because the Louder Words Option 
allows someone to challenge the legitimacy of a President’s apparent enactment of a law.  
Such a challenge would pit the judicial branch against the executive branch, possibly 
implicating any of factors (4), (5) and (6) listed above.  The challenge may be viewed as 
disrespectful questioning of a political decision made by the President to enact a bill into 
law and such a challenge may be embarrassing for the Executive branch.   
The District Court in the District of Columbia has ruled that the political question 
doctrine precludes challenging a statute’s validity in an arguably related situation.105  
The issue in Hershey Foods was whether the President had sufficient time to review a bill 
and formulate an approval before signing it and the court ruled that a determination as to 
whether a President was able to sufficiently formulate a sense of approval or not was a 
non-justiciable political question.106  Unlike in Hershey Foods, however, challenges to 
the validity of a statute under the Louder Words Option address actually formulated 
expressions of disapproval and do not question whether enough time was allowed to 
formulate a sense of approval or disapproval. 
At the heart of challenging a statute under the Louder Words Option is the 
meaning of the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, specifically whether a President 
has enacted the statute under the Presentment Clause.  The Supreme Court has declared 
that “on general principles, the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one, and 
must be so regarded by the courts of the United States.”107  It is the responsibility of the 
                                                 
103 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
104 Id. at 217. 
105 Hershey Foods Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 158 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C., 2001). 
106 Id. at 41 (D.D.C., 2001). 
107 In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 498 (1891).   
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Supreme Court to both interpret the Constitution and to determine whether one branch of 
the government exceeds their authority under the Constitution.108  Moreover, even if the 
Court must interpret the Constitution in conflict with another branch of the government 
the Court still has an obligation to embrace their role as final authority in interpreting the 
Constitution.109 
Numerous federal circuit courts have specifically limited application of the 
political question doctrine in challenges to statute validity to issues of whether the statute 
was enacted properly under internal legislative rules, but exclude from the political 
question doctrine challenges to statutory validity in regards to constitutional or statutory 
requirements.110  Questioning whether a President enacted a bill into law according to 
the Presentment Clause falls squarely as a constitutional requirements issue – and, 
therefore, outside the scope of the political question doctrine. 
Challenges to whether a President has constitutionally enacted a bill into law by 
signing and simultaneously expressing disapproval of the bill are challenges to the 
validity of the statute on constitutional grounds.  The federal court system assumes 
responsibility for just such questions and has expressed policy not to avoid them under 
the political question doctrine.  Accordingly, the courts should not avoid addressing 
whether a statute has been constitutionally enacted under the Louder Words Option by 
employing the political question doctrine.  
The Louder Words Option Creates More Uncertainty 
 
Opening a statute’s constitutionality up to litigation based on a “disapproving” 
signing statement arguably creates uncertainty regarding statutory legitimacy, uncertainty 
which is contrary to public policy.  Under such a system, courts would have to articulate 
the boundaries of what constitutes “disapproving” signing statements and until such time 
as the boundaries became clear there would be uncertainty whenever a President said 
anything disparaging about a bill he was signing. 
                                                 
108 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210. (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of the government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds 
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a 
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.” (emphasis added)). 
109 U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 3915 (1990) (quoting from Powell v. McCormack,  395 U.S. 486, 
549 (1969):  “Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution 
in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.  The alleged conflict 
that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the court’ avoiding their constitutional responsibility.”) 
110 See 15 LOUIS R. FUMER, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL §101.117, Chapter 101 E.7.a.  (cites 
holdings from 3rd Circuit, 5th Circuit, 9th Circuit and D.C. Circuit and concludes:  “In determining whether 
to review challenges to the validity of legislative enactments, the lower federal courts have distinguished 
between claims of violation of external constitutional or statutory requirements from claims of violation of 
internal legislative rules.  Although the decisions have not been entirely consistent, generally the courts 
have agreed to review the former on merits, and have declined to review the latter on grounds of the 
political question doctrine.”). 
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The boundaries of “disapproval”, however, should not be difficult to ascertain.  
Since the President has signed any bill in question there is a presumption of approval.  
Such a presumption should only be overcome with clear evidence of disapproval.  Courts 
should interpret Presidential signing statements as consistent with the meaning and intent 
Congress attributed to a bill prior to presentment if at all possible.  Just as courts try to 
interpret legislation consistent with the Constitution in order to avoid constitutional 
difficulties, courts should also interpret presidential signing statements consistent with 
Congressional meaning and intent as much as possible to avoid constitutional difficulties.  
Only when a presidential signing statement cannot reasonably be construed as consistent 
with the Congressional meaning and intent should the signing statement qualify as a 
“disapproving” signing statement. 
An allegation that the Louder Words Option would “create more” statutory 
uncertainty is illusory, it should actually reduce uncertainty.  Uncertainly already exists 
when a President verbally disapproves of a bill as he signs it.   Opening the 
constitutionality of such statutes up to litigation actually provides a means for resolving 
an existing uncertainty rather than creates additional uncertainty.   Furthermore, enabling 
people to hold a President accountability for his signing statements will likely reduce the 
extent to which he expresses disapproving signing statements – which will reduce 
uncertainty overall.  Even if statutory uncertainty is not reduced under the Louder Words 
Option, the Option’s closer adherence to the text, intent and purpose of the Constitution 
justifies its incorporation.  
IV. DISAPPROVING SIGNING STATEMENTS IN INTERPRETING 
STATUTES 
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Signing statements can be a powerful legislative tool for a President.  As one 
author summarizes, Presidents can use signing statements in three principal ways:  
[B]y interpreting ambiguous statutory language in a manner that the 
president hopes will be treated by the courts as a legitimate form of 
legislative history; 
 
by instructing the president’s subordinates in the executive agencies to 
resolve statutory ambiguities in a way favored by the president; and 
 
by creating a record that can be used later to refute claims that the 
president has approved of constitutionally dubious provision in bills that 
the president has chosen to sign because of his desire to see other 
provision of the legislation become law. 111 
 
These purposes have a common objective – to strategically place a President’s 
interpretation on a statute without subjecting the President to accountability to Congress 
or the nation as a whole for that interpretation. 
This paper does not venture to join a general debate as to the virtue of including 
presidential signing statements in a bill’s legislative history.  Instead, the first subsection 
will provide a general background into the existing debate and rapidly focus onto 
disapproving signing statements and their role in statutory interpretation – the subject of 
the second subsection.  This paper concludes that denying interpretive authority to 
disapproving signing statements, regardless whether one subscribes to the Louder 
Actions Option or Louder Words Option, would promote important constitutional norms. 
A. Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation 
Courts have looked to presidential signing statements when interpreting 
statutes.112  Yet, the issue of whether a president’s signing statement is properly 
                                                 
111 Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency,1995 B.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 43-44 (1995). 
112 See, e.g., Ft. Sill Apache Tribe v. United States, 477 F.2d 1360, 1376 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1973) (court 
observed that limitations of Indian Claims Commission Act had been limited to land and property rights as 
a result of President Truman’s signing statement upon signing the Act); Don’t Waste Arizona, Inc. v. 
McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 972, 976 (D. Ariz. 1996) (court used President Bush’s signing statement 
to determine the minimum showings required of a litigant to bring a suit for violating the amended Clean 
Air Act); United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 2002) (court looks to presidential signing 
statement to find the purpose of statutory amendments). 
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included in the legislative history for use in interpreting a resulting statute has been a 
subject of debate between proponents113 and opponents114 for years115.  The debate 
has taken greatest form since the Reagan administration, during which “serious efforts to 
use [signing statements] as a tool for advancing a coherent legal strategy began.”116  As 
one author put it: “President Reagan inserted more interpretations of statutes into signing 
statements than any of his predecessors.”117  The “use of these interpretations was 
carefully orchestrated to enhance presidential influence on statutory interpretation.”118   
Proponents of incorporating presidential signing statements into legislative history 
focus on the legislative process as a whole and seek to include all information relevant to 
the process in legislative history in order to provide the most detailed view of the 
reasoning behind a statute’s enactment.  “Legislative history, in its broadest sense, 
includes all relevant events occurring before final enactment.  In its narrower, more usual, 
and legally more controversial sense, it refers to the ‘relevant events comprising the 
enactment process.’”119  Proponents see a President as a member of the legislative 
process that enacted a statute so his comments must be relevant in determining the 
statute’s meaning.   
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in the Creation of 
Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239 (1995); Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute is it 
Anyway?: Why and How Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal 
Statutes, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 475 (1997); Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President’s 
Place in “Legislative History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399 (1990).   Justice Scalia also includes presidential 
signing statements in legislative history when a President signs a bill in one of the few times he embarks 
into legislative history analysis (see, Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, n.2 (1993)). 
114 See, e.g., Boulris, supra note 52; William D. Popkin, judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A 
Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991); Brad Waltes, Note, Let me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REV. 755 (1987).  
115 Presidential signing statements have been controversial since President Jackson attempted what 
“amounted to an item veto” with his signing statement in 1830 (Brownell, supra note 10, at 1351). 
116 Lund, supra note 111, at 43. 
117 Popkin, supra note 114, at 703. 
118 Id. at 704. 
119 Dessayer, supra note 113, at 399 (HIGHLIGHTS section). 
  - 40 - 
Opponents often point to an apparent separation of powers violation by allowing 
the President’s comments to affect statutory meaning when he is not formally a 
legislator120  but rather a check-gate vested solely with the power of approval or 
disapproval after the legislative action is complete121.  As one opponent states:  “The 
imposition of presidential opinion [into statutory interpretation] allows the President to 
create and execute legislation unchecked by another branch of government.  As a result, 
the separation of powers doctrine is violated.”122  Of particular concern is Presidential 
manipulation of statutory meaning that goes unchecked by any other branch of 
government: “the President is not a legislator and [] signing statements containing 
specific statements about statutory meaning are often politically manipulative attempts to 
undermine statutory structure or achieve results too controversial to be adopted in the 
text.”123  In sum, opponents tend to be of the position that “[t]here is no specific 
provision [in the Constitution] authorizing [a President] to change any provision of [a] 
bill or to assign any interpretation of its meaning”124 so his signing statements should 
carry no interpretive weight. 
The Constitution does not have a specific provision authorizing a President “to 
change any provision of a bill or to assign any interpretation of its meaning.”125  
However, there is also “no constitutional basis for objecting to his expounding his views 
with respect to the bill” – provided he adds no new matter to the bill itself.126  “New 
                                                 
120 See, Carroll, supra note 113, at 501 (“court use of signing statements violates the principle of separation 
of powers because the President is not a legislator.”).  See also references in id. at n.141.   
121 “It is then important to recognize that a signing statement is … a commentary rendered after legislative 
action is completed and the resulting measure presented to the President for approval.”  Killenbeck, supra 
note 113, at 276. 
122 Waltes, supra note 114, at 761. 
123 Popkin, supra note 114, at 700. 
124 Zinn, supra note 10, at 25-26. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 26-27. 
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matter” refers to anything “inconsistent with statement in the committee report and other 
elements of the history” of the bill.127 
Using a presidential signing statement to interpret statutory meaning is 
particularly troublesome when the signing statement disapproves of the statute, or any 
portion of it.  That is where the subject of this paper enters the debate and is the subject of 
the next subsection. 
B. Disapproving Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation 
Since President Jackson used a signing statement to assert his interpretation of a 
bill before him in 1830, Congress has condemned signing statements that project an 
interpretation of a bill in conflict with Congress’s interpretation as being an objection in 
substance and an approval in form.128  This is the very conflict at the core of this paper – 
a President’s disapproving signing statement and concomitant signature is an objection in 
substance and an approval in form.  To use a President’s disapproving signing statement 
to interpret a statute utilizes his “objection in substance” to interpret that which he has 
“approved in form.”  Use of a disapproving signing statement for statutory interpretation 
(a) lacks the legislative character on which proponents of using signing statements for 
interpretation rely; (b) violates the intent of the Presentment Clause; (c) violates the 
purpose of the Presentment Clause; and (d) conflicts with public policy.   
Whichever option one embraces – Louder Actions Option or Louder Words 
Option – a president’s disapproving signing statements do not play any role in the 
                                                 
127 Id. at 27. 
128 President Jackson asserted his own interpretation of a bill he signed into law in 1830, one of the first 
uses of presidential signing statements (see notes 10 and 115, supra).  Shortly later President Tyler did a 
similar thing.  The House of Representative submitted a report in response that was severely critical of both 
acts being in substance an objection and in form an approval of the bill – and that such conflicting response 
to a bill is unwarranted by the Constitution.  See Zinn, supra note 10, at 26 (citing Begehot, The English 
Constitution 2d Edition (1873) p. 122).  See also Popkin, supra note 114, at 717 (“Presidential legislative 
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legislative process and, as such, lack the legislative character relied on by proponents of 
using signing statement for statutory interpretation.  Any disapproving signing statement 
within the Louder Actions Option was necessarily deemed to carry negligible weight and 
play no role in the enactment process.  It is inconsistent to later turn to the disapproving 
signing statement and grant it interpretive weight as though it was significant in the 
enactment process.  Any disapproving signing statement under the Louder Words Option 
served as evidence of presidential disapproval of a bill.  Since the bill was not approved 
by the President the President played no affirmative role in enacting the bill.129 It would 
be improper to look to the President’s comments on the bill to interpret the resulting 
statute when the President did not participate in the legislative process of enacting the bill 
into law.130 
The intent behind the Presentment Clause is to provide the President a qualified 
negative over legislation.131  To afford interpretative weight to a disapproving signing 
statement conflicts with this intent by empowering a President to modify or completely 
negate legislation through a signing statement without being subject to Congressional 
review.  In other words, a President could effect an unqualified veto power through the 
use of a disapproving signing statement.132 
                                                                                                                                                 
history should be an interpretive aid only when it records agreement with legislators and cites traditional 
legislative history, such as committee reports.”). 
129 Recall, under the Louder Words Option a bill subject to a President’s disapproving signing statement 
only becomes law if Congress is in session 10 days after presentment since the President neither approved 
the bill nor returned it to Congress since it falls subject to the pocket veto clause of the Constitution. (U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, fourth sentence). 
130 Even proponents of using presidential signing statements point to the President as a legislator in the 
enactment process in order to give weight to his commentary on the resulting statute.  Removing the 
President from the enactment process dramatically weakens the proponent’s argument for then the 
President is no more a legislator than you or me. 
131 See notes 21-24, supra, and associated text. 
132 “[P]residents have in effect exercised ‘line item’ veto power over non-spending bills  … largely through 
presidential signing statements.”  Brownell, supra note 10, at 1351.  “[T]he President may declare in a 
signing statement that a provision of the bill before him is flatly unconstitutional, and that he will refuse to 
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One purpose of the Presentment Clause is to enable a President to protect the 
national interests of the country as a whole from potentially harmful or unwise 
legislation.133  However, allowing disapproving signing statements to affect statutory 
meaning harms national well being by creating uncertainty in statutory meaning (via 
interpretive disapproval) or statutory legitimacy (via substantive disapproval).  Is a 
citizen to rely on the meaning of the statute that the President has enacted in form with 
his signature or on the statute that the President has enacted in substance with his 
words?134  Is a corporation to plan their growth development and corporate policies 
based on an assumption that a portion of a statute is unconstitutional as per a presidential 
signing statement or more conservatively assume the entire statute is valid?135  Such 
conflicts cause citizens to live in uncertainty as to what is actually statutorily forbidden, 
an uncertainty that is not in the best interest of the nation.  Obviating the impact of a 
signing statement relieves this level of confusion. 
Sound public policy discourages the use of disapproving presidential signing 
statements in statutory interpretation.  In addition to creating uncertainty, use of 
disapproving signing statements fosters lack of accountability for decisions on the part of 
both the President and Congress.  A President can hedge his position by appearing to 
enact a bill into law by signing it, but then disapproving a bill through a signing 
statement.  He can thereby avoid liability for approving the legislation (he voiced his 
                                                                                                                                                 
enforce it.  … One reasons such signing statement may be controversial is that the refusal to execute a 
statutory provision has substantially the effect of a line-item veto.”  Dellinger, supra note 75, at 336, n.6. 
133 See notes 30-31, supra, and associated text. 
134 Consider the observation that the first President Bush raised constitutional issues in his signing 
statements with apparent design “mostly to … [avoid] the appearance that the President approved of 
objectionable provisions in the legislation he signed” while pursuing a desire to see other provision of the 
legislation become law. Lund, supra note 111, at 44. 
135 Corporate growth plans can involve tremendous investments, investments that my be lost if the 
corporation relies on a portion of a bill to be unconstitutional only to later find out it is constitutional and 
being enforced by another administration. 
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disapproval) or disapproving it (he enacted the bill into law) depending on which position 
later best suits him.  This fosters further public uncertainty not only in statutory meaning 
but in knowing where the President stands on a legislative issue.   
Moreover, precluding disapproving signing statement from influencing statutory 
interpretation may actually motivate Congress to clearly articulate meaning for their bills 
prior to presenting them to a President.  When Congress clearly establishes meaning for a 
bill they leave less room for a President to ascribe unqualified meaning of his own with a 
signing statement, meaning that may conflict with the intent of Congress.  If Congress 
has made their meaning known, such a signing statement becomes a disapproving signing 
statement and would carry no interpretive weight.  Hence, Congress can protect their 
intent for a bill by clearly articulating its meaning up front – a policy that makes a bill 
more clear for all – which is good public policy. 
For these reasons, disapproving signing statements should play no role in 
statutory interpretation – regardless of whether a statute was enacted under the concept of 
the Louder Action Option or Louder Words Option.   
V. CONCLUSION 
A disapproving signing statement creates uncertainty as to whether a President 
has constitutionally enacted a bill that he has just signed.  The Presentment Clause of the 
Constitution requires that a President both approve and sign a bill in order to enact that 
bill into law.  A disapproving signing statement brings into question whether the 
President has “approved” the bill or just signed it.  Signing statements can qualify as 
either interpretively or substantively disapproving.  An interpretively disapproving 
signing statement ascribes a textual meaning to a bill that conflicts with clear meaning set 
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for by Congress prior to presenting the bill to the President, thereby raising uncertainty as 
to what the true meaning of the resulting law actually is.  A substantively disapproving 
signing statement accepts Congress’s interpretive meaning for the text of a bill but 
contradicts Congress’s substantive understanding of and intent for the bill (e.g., a signing 
statement declaring a portion of a bill unconstitutional and not to be enforced contradicts 
Congress’s understanding that the bill is constitutional and their intent to enact the bill 
into law), thereby raising uncertainty as to the legitimacy of a law.  Uncertainties created 
by disapproving signing statements force people to risk their personal liberties as they try 
to discern just what a law really expects of them. 
The Presentment Clause provides constitutional guidelines articulating a 
President’s role in enacting federal statutes.  Textually, the Presentment Clause provides 
the following principles regarding a President:  (1) A President may enact a bill into law 
only by both approving and signing the bill; (2) If a President disapproves of a bill he has 
an obligation to return the bill to Congress with his objections so they may review the bill 
in light of the objections; and (3) If a President does not approve and sign a bill or return 
the bill to Congress with his objections within ten days of the bill’s presentment to him 
the bill becomes law if Congress is in session and dies if Congress is out of session.  The 
intent behind a President’s role in legislation under the Presentment Clause is to grant 
him a qualified negative over legislation proposed by Congress.  The negative is 
“qualified” in that Congress has a right to overrule a presidential negative after 
subsequent review of the President’s objections.  The purpose for the qualified negative is 
to provide a President power to protect his self interests and to protect the interests of the 
nation as a whole.   
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Within the constitutional foundation of the Presentment Clause, there are only two 
options for resolving the conflict between a President’s disapproving signing statement 
and his concomitant signature on a bill when determining whether the President has 
enacted the bill into law.  The signature can prevail as evidence of approval and the bill 
becomes law with the disapproving signing statement being deemed insignificant in 
regards to presidential approval.  Alternatively, the disapproving signing statement can 
rebut the signature and evidence the President’s disapproval of the bill and preclude the 
President’s from enacting the bill into law. 
The federal courts have adopted a conventional approach in line with the former 
option.  The United States Supreme Court has not found any evidence of disapproval that 
rebuts a President’s signature as evidence of approval, even when faced with a signing 
statement declaring a portion of a bill unconstitutional.  The D.C. District Court has gone 
so far as to conclude that a President’s signature serves a dual purpose under the 
Presentment Clause of indicating approval and serving as the signature (evidence of that 
approval). In other words, the President’s actions speak louder than his words. 
Nonetheless, the latter option of allowing a disapproving signing statement to 
rebut a signature as evidence of approval aligns better with the text, intent and purpose of 
the Presentment Clause.  Textually, the Presentment Clause requires a President to both 
approve and sign a bill in order to enact it into law.  A disapproving signing statement 
evidences lack of approval.  The second option acknowledges the disapproving signing 
statement as evidence of disapproval yet the first option ignores the statement in form 
while allowing a President to implement it in effect by not enforcing those portions of a 
law he disapproves.  In regards to intent, a disapproving signing statement grants a 
President power to negate all or a portion of a bill that he enacts into law without giving 
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Congress a chance to review his objections with the bill.  Such a power affords the 
President an “absolute” negative rather than a “qualified” negative as the framers of the 
Constitution intended for him to have.  In regard to purpose, a disapproving signing 
statement causes confusion as to what is the actual law.  While the enacting President 
may not approve of a portion of a bill and not enforce it, yet a subsequent President may 
approve of that portion and enforce it.  The people are left in uncertainty as to what is the 
law and what is not – a law-abiding citizen cannot know how to obey the law.  Hence, the 
“enacting” President violated the purpose of the Presentment Clause by not acting in the 
best interest of the nation as a whole.  Ultimately, the Presidents words of disapproval 
should speak louder than his actions of signing. 
A disapproving signing statement should have no effect in statutory interpretation 
regardless of which option one uses to resolve the conflict between a disapproving 
signing statement and a signature on a bill.  To do otherwise would unquestionably 
empower a President with an absolute negative over legislation – a power clearly not 
supported in the Presentment Clause.  By its very nature, a disapproving signing 
statement conflicts with a meaning (interpretively or substantively) afforded a bill by 
Congress.  To allow a President to persuade courts to interpret a bill to have a meaning 
conflicting with Congress’ intended meaning affords the President an absolute negative 
rather than a qualified negative.  Besides, under either option, a disapproving signing 
statement plays no role in the enacting of a bill.  To later grant a statement authority in 
interpreting a resulting statute after denying that same statement authority in enacting the 
statute is inconsistent.  Whether the disapproving signing statement is ignored or 
acknowledge in regards to statutory enactment, it should be silent in statutory 
interpretation. 
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